

but we will not have the ordinary budget authority they need to continue to be funding when we run out of this supplemental.

Those are examples of some of the failures on our part, but they are failures multiplied with the situation with respect to Iraqi security forces. Our plan is to transfer, we hope one day, security operations to the Iraqis. Yet we have not provided sufficient equipment for these forces.

Senior commanders in Iraq have commented persistently about the lack of adequate equipment for the security forces, and a March 22 New York Times article stated:

Senior American commanders in Iraq are publicly complaining that delays in delivering radios, body armor and other equipment have hobbled their ability to build an effective Iraqi security force that can ultimately replace United States troops here.

MG Charles Swannack, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, has returned from Iraq and his frustrations on this point are extremely significant. He said, in retrospect, if he knew the equipment was not coming, he would have used his own resources to buy body armor, radios, and vehicles for these Iraqi security forces. We are not doing enough to provide replacement for our own forces, and we are not adequately funding our present forces in the field.

Those points are examples, I believe, of the failings in terms of occupation planning and military occupation of Iraq. But there are also political failures. We are less than 100 days away from transferring authority to an interim government, and yet no one can tell us what that interim government will look like. Will it be an increased governing council with 20, 30, 40 more people? Is it going to be a three-person presidency with a prime minister? We are 100 days or less away from that transfer of authority. We have yet to have a nominee to be the new ambassador to Iraq. Mr. Bremer leaves on June 30, but we have yet to have a name submitted to us for consideration and confirmation for someone who will have extraordinary challenges, extraordinary responsibilities. And yet we are 100 days or less away from the new ambassador of the United States to Iraq taking his or her post.

Probably most emblematic, most symbolic of the political difficulties is the de-Baathification program. One of the key problems of this program is it is being run by Chalabi. Chalabi is an individual in the Iraqi National Congress who provided most of the misinformation to the administration as they made their judgments about the imminence of a threat in Iraq. He has been on our payroll to the tune of about \$300,000 a month funneled through the Iraqi National Congress for many years. He is still on the payroll. He has seized all the security files of the former Iraqi security agency which perhaps are a treasure trove of names of people who collaborated both

inside Iraq and outside Iraq with the Saddam Hussein regime. But most importantly for the moment, he is in charge of vetting former Baathists to take positions in this new government.

He is sitting at the crossroads of billions of dollars of contracts from his position on the Iraqi Governing Council. He is also an individual who has the right to deny people their civil rights, if you will, in Iraq, and he is someone whose record does not, I think, suggest he is capable of discharging those responsibilities in the interest of Iraq or in the interest of the United States. The key to Mr. Chalabi is self-interest and always has been.

As a result, we are giving this individual inordinate power. This is not just a theoretical political argument. When I was in Iraq last November, I spoke to the division commander, and he complained to me he had 1,000 schoolteachers who could not teach because they had been nominal members of the Baath Party. Back in the days of Saddam Hussein, in order to have a job in Iraq of any consequence, you had to have a Baath affiliation. These people cannot work. Schools cannot open. And so this new Iraq we are desperately trying to build based upon not just security, but also economic development and education, has not yet taken off.

This is just one example of the political miscalculation I believe in which the provisional authority, Ambassador Bremer, has engaged in Iraq.

All of this is very important. We are, again, weeks away from transferring authority to some form of government of which we know not the exact details. We are also in a situation where each day we see the cost in terms of American lives.

Let me make one final point. When I was in Iraq talking with American soldiers about 10 days ago, the palpable concern they had with these explosive devices was obvious. We have soldiers who are paying Iraqis to put some type of armor on their doors because canvas doors do not stop a lot of small arms rounds or anything else.

We owe much more to those troops. We owe a budget that is real and timely, and we owe leadership here that will respond to their needs.

I yield the floor.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Morning business is closed.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the hour of 10 a.m. having arrived, the Chair lays before the Senate a message from the House to accompany S. Con. Res. 95.

The Acting President pro tempore laid before the Senate a message from

the House of Representatives, as follows:

S. CON. RES. 95

Resolved, That the resolution from the Senate (S. Con. Res. 95) entitled "Concurrent resolution setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2005 and including the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2006 through 2009", do pass with the following amendment:

Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert:

SECTION 1. CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005.

(a) *DECLARATION*.—The Congress declares that the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2005 is hereby established and that the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2004 and 2006 through 2009 are set forth.

(b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS*.—The table of contents for this concurrent resolution is as follows:

Sec. 1. Concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2005.

TITLE I—RECOMMENDED LEVELS AND AMOUNTS

Sec. 101. Recommended levels and amounts.

Sec. 102. Major functional categories.

TITLE II—RECONCILIATION AND REPORT SUBMISSIONS

Sec. 201. Reconciliation in the House of Representatives.

Sec. 202. Submission of report on savings to be used for members of the Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

TITLE III—RESERVE FUNDS AND CONTINGENCY PROCEDURE

Subtitle A—Reserve Funds for Legislation Assumed in Budget Aggregates

Sec. 301. Deficit-neutral reserve fund for health insurance for the uninsured.

Sec. 302. Deficit-neutral reserve fund for the Family Opportunity Act.

Sec. 303. Deficit-neutral reserve fund for Military Survivors' Benefit Plan.

Sec. 304. Reserve fund for pending legislation.

Subtitle B—Contingency Procedure

Sec. 311. Contingency procedure for surface transportation.

TITLE IV—BUDGET ENFORCEMENT

Sec. 401. Restrictions on advance appropriations.

Sec. 402. Emergency legislation.

Sec. 403. Compliance with section 13301 of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.

Sec. 404. Application and effect of changes in allocations and aggregates.

TITLE V—SENSE OF THE HOUSE

Sec. 501. Sense of the House on spending accountability.

Sec. 502. Sense of the House on entitlement reform.

TITLE I—RECOMMENDED LEVELS AND AMOUNTS

SEC. 101. RECOMMENDED LEVELS AND AMOUNTS.

The following budgetary levels are appropriate for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2009:

(1) *FEDERAL REVENUES*.—For purposes of the enforcement of this resolution:

(A) The recommended levels of Federal revenues are as follows:

Fiscal year 2004: \$1,272,966,000,000.

Fiscal year 2005: \$1,457,215,000,000.

Fiscal year 2006: \$1,619,835,000,000.

Fiscal year 2007: \$1,721,568,000,000.

Fiscal year 2008: \$1,818,559,000,000.

Fiscal year 2009: \$1,922,133,000,000.

(B) The amounts by which the aggregate levels of Federal revenues should be reduced are as follows:

Fiscal year 2004: —\$179,000,000.

Fiscal year 2005: \$19,919,000,000.

Fiscal year 2006: \$34,346,000,000.